

LETTERS

Let's Not Give the OPFOR Too Much Credit, He Says

Dear Sir:

Oh, c'mon. We should all be as lucky as the OPFOR. The true source for the OPFOR's success in the battles fought at the NTC is found in the article, but it is glossed over in a barrage of accolades heaped on their training, their TTPs, and their righteousness in maintaining focus. Nevertheless, it's really simple: the battle they have to fight is easier; they have the opportunity to train on a narrow set of missions frequently; and they know the terrain.

Permanently task-organized? Of course they are. They only have one operational requirement — to be the OPFOR. No other requirement is superimposed on them. They never get sent to fight forest fires or to support ROTC camps or to provide relief to victims of hurricanes, riots, ethnic cleansing, floods, or, for that matter, to screen a corps front or flank in all kinds of terrain and conditions, *ad infinitum*. Nor are they sent off once every 18 months or so to fight at a training area far from their home station against the unit that lives there and trains there. No other mission requirements exist to preclude them from training down to the individual certifiable level repeatedly on the only terrain where they will ever perform a limited set of tasks. The rest of the Army is pretty busy with a hefty schedule of operational requirements. The OPFOR's operational requirement is right outside the back gate of their motor pool.

Masters of command and control? The BOSs being orchestrated present a different and simpler challenge to the OPFOR than they do to their BLUEFOR counterparts. Choosing engagement areas, defilade positions, obstacle locations, avenues of approach, routes — whether they really do go through an abbreviated MDMP or not — have got to be a little easier when operating somewhere where every rock and depression has a first name and every action has been walked over weeks or months or years in advance.

Computerized artillery units that never get lost, never miss. Maneuvering in demi-tanks with 2-man crews instead of 60-ton main battle tanks. Chemical warfare? Ever seen an OPFOR soldier with his mask on in MOPP IV? How about logistics? Big part of the battle for the BLUEFOR — just not an issue with the OPFOR, where resupply, medevac, Class IV/VII/IX, battlefield repair, etc., is not a part of the game. The battle is simply easier.

Train more frequently? How about doing a TF-sized maneuver exercise monthly? Fatigue with all that training? Not really. Mostly company-sized exercises — day trips to the field — once a month at the battalion level. Hot chow on the objective? Hot chow is in the mess hall on main post when they return from the day's battle.

The OPFOR is a great training aid that has meant a great deal to the proficiency of the

U.S. Army in its conduct of military operations. But let's not give them too much credit for what appears to be tactical proficiency.

The OPFOR operates with profligate frequency on the only terrain on which they will ever operate. The rest of the Army is not so lucky. Operational requirements and limited budgets make the frequency of practicing combat missions problematic and the likelihood of doing it over and over on the same terrain remote. The OPFOR's mission is simple and resources are matched to it.

Train a lot over the same terrain week after week, focus on nothing else, remove logistics from the equation and negate the probability of operating in assorted terrain under varied conditions and you'll get pretty good at a simple task. They train on a narrow set of tasks a lot and they know the terrain. No one else's mission statement is quite that simple. Nice job if you can get it.

JAMES G. DIEHL
COL, Armor
Via email

OPFOR Doesn't Present A Realistic Comparison

Dear Sir:

I found the May-June 1999 *ARMOR* to be a most interesting issue, especially the articles on Grozny, Dr. John Daley's piece on the fighting in Spain, and Colonel Rosenberger's lengthy article on reaching full combat potential in the 21st century. On the latter, I am impressed at how extensive preparations are for the OPFOR at the NTC. It seems to go on and on, and since OPFOR fights in the same place (as near as I can tell), well, by golly, they ought to be ready! Would a unit in combat in strange territory be able to go through this vast and repetitious routine?

He notes that incoming units cannot match OPFOR in training and preparation, and execution, so it is not difficult to see why they lose most of the time. No doubt, even so, these incoming units learn a host of useful lessons — but one must wonder how long these lessons stick and are passed on. Unless I have misunderstood Colonel Rosenberger's presentation, it looks that these returning incoming units come to NTC with nearly a clean slate. If this is a valid conclusion, then our units never will be as ready as they should be.

Throughout his article, he repeats that the rest of the Army cannot do what OPFOR does, and this is quite chilling. And then, after noting this circumstance, he admonishes us to roll up our sleeves. And do what? With what? When?

Are we as dead in the water as he claims? A pessimist probably would conclude that as long as present conditions continue to prevail (administration hostility to the military, insufficient funding and staffing, excessive deployments, inadequate effective training, degraded combat readiness, high turnover, increased

departure of those who readily see the handwriting on the wall, et al) — there is no hope. Is this the real message, colonel?

GEORGE G. EDDY
COL, USA (Ret.)
Austin, Texas

Bradley IFV/CFV Design Was Driven by the Soviet Challenge

Dear Sir:

I am reaching the age at which histories are being written that cover events I lived through and, like some WWII vets I know, perhaps the best policy is silence. Still, recent discussions on the design of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in your fine journal demand some comment — not to belabor the past but to allow the current generation of cavalymen to understand fully our combat vehicle design decisions as they begin the process of designing the Army After Next class of vehicles.

As MAJ Winstead brilliantly pointed out in his May-June 1999 letter to *ARMOR*, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle design was a compromise of many doctrinal, technological, and economic issues. Although this will always be the case, even for the richest nation on earth, and MG Sheridan understands this better than most professionals, it is very important to understand how and why these compromises were made. MAJ Winstead's conclusion that the BFV design and doctrinal employment are inadequate for 21st century warfare is correct, in my opinion, but for very different reasons.

The first factor to understand is that the fighting vehicle concept is a Soviet idea reflecting Soviet doctrine. It is every bit as much an achievement as the T34 tank and the Kalashnikov rifle — so much so that all major armies copied the concept shortly after the BMP was introduced. Imitation is the most sincere form of flattery, particularly in the field of weapons design, where original thought is so scarce. Soviet doctrine since the spectacular WWII victory that saved their country has been to concentrate forces at the critical point, conduct a mounted breakthrough under overwhelming artillery attacks and drive for deep, critical objectives. This very consistent doctrine has, until recently, driven their infantry, tank, and artillery design: large numbers of relatively simple weapons systems that support this doctrine, i.e., large, relatively inaccurate guns on small tanks; small infantry squads that fight mounted during the breakthrough (hence Infantry Fighting Vehicle); and massive artillery/rocket/missile formations.

The BFV, therefore, is a Soviet concept done in grand American style — bigger, better, and more expensive. When the BMP was being deployed, we were mired in a land war in Asia, more worried about bombers and jungle boots. When Abrams/DePuy/Starry and some outstanding Chiefs of Staff put the Army back together, we threw large dollars at modernization and came up with the Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and now the Cru-

sader artillery system (20 years later). The Abrams is a world class tank, thanks to some very talented, disciplined designers at Chrysler Defense and TACOM, albeit with German armament and British armor. The Bradley suffered from uncertain U.S. infantry doctrine in the post-Vietnam era which, in my opinion, continues today and is the major obstacle to the design of vehicles for AAN. The specific Sheridan/Winstead points are:

Battlefield taxi vs. fighting vehicle. The Bradley was designed as a fighting vehicle but was immediately compromised by weight/size limitations and U.S. doctrine. U.S. infantry wanted to keep the large squads, did not really want to fight mounted, and was smart enough to know it didn't have overmatching artillery support anyway, with WWII formations declining from fully one third of a division to the paltry numbers of today. Firing ports were discarded soon after fielding. Armor protection was state of the art, but completely inadequate in the face of another Soviet invention, the Sagger anti-tank missile. Ft. Benning wisely accepted the better mobility and firepower of the Bradley but avoided the fighting vehicle doctrine whenever possible. MAJ Winstead is correct that monthly NTC blood baths demonstrate vividly the error of BFV head-on engagements, and poor U.S. mechanized infantry doctrine continues to be masked by improper lessons from Desert Storm. One hopes that perceptive infantry leaders will make do until doctrine catches up with the times.

Armament. The TOW AT missile launcher and two-man turret were major design compromises, caused by lack of capability against Soviet tank divisions in Europe at the time, and continue to cause doctrinal problems. How can the vehicle be 2-3 kms in overwatch and still be accompanying the Abrams onto the objective? Is the 25mm a precision or area weapon? Suffice it to say that the BMP had a direct fire cannon and missile launcher — ours do, too. The advent of fire-and-forget AT missiles, such as the U.S. Javelin, may cause new thinking — soon, we hope — although the Marine AAV and the U.S. Future Scout Vehicle appear to have missed this leap-ahead opportunity.

Mobility. The Bradley was a great improvement in battlefield mobility for its time, although it is, in my opinion, still its greatest limitation for future battlefields. The next infantry vehicle, and tank for that matter, needs to fly over obstacles and fight successfully on the ground. Technology is not the limiting factor, only doctrine and proponent inertia. The Bradley swimming issue, another BMP mirror-image threat and infantry-cavalry compromise, can be avoided by flight if some original thinking is done.

"The Pentagon Wars." I should have been upset by being portrayed as ineffective and unethical in the HBO movie, but have come to realize that the few people who saw it believe it to be comic satire of our bumbling defense establishment and are not concerned with the core issues involved. This is as it should be.

Some parts of the movie are unfortunately laughably true, but the basic issues are so distorted that the only casualty is my trust in the historical record according to Washington D.C. and Hollywood, Calif.

Where do we go from here? The Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV) concept work has begun and the Future Scout Vehicle is trying to be born as a joint U.S./U.K. demonstrator program. In the short run, relatively peaceful times and low RDTE budgets will probably mean that the 17 years it took to develop the Bradley will be exceeded. Design compromises will have to be made, of course, but can be kept to a minimum if a forward-looking, clear and consistent how-to-fight doctrine is developed for AAN and disciplined leadership rises to the occasion.

FRANK HARTLINE
COL, Armor (Ret.)
Tucson, Ariz.

Future Mounted Forces, And the Shape of a New Army

Dear Sir:

I am a light infantryman by commission and experience. Therefore, read what follows with Caveat Emptor in mind. My love affair with the mounted arm began at the age of 16 when I read my father's dog-eared copy of *JEB Stuart* by John W. Thomason, a Marine — go figure. Since that time, I have read, no devoured, every book and article on mounted combat I could get my hands on, including every issue of *ARMOR* for the last 38 years. My bookshelves and filing cabinets are full to overflowing. I am comfortable with the mindset of Murat, Kellermann, and Stuart, as well as Antal, Benson, MacGregor, Rosenberger, and Thompson. What follows then are the results of the lessons gleaned from the great masters as well as the modern practitioners. Based upon these lessons, I will further go way out on a limb, and propose a mounted force structure for the twenty-first century.

There are four rules for mounted combat, as I see them:

(1) Never fight fair: Strength on strength combat, when avoidable, is a waste of men and equipment. Properly conceived maneuver, attacking C4I, fire support, and logistical assets render the enemy's maneuver assets irrelevant. Tanks and IFVs that are out of gas and ammo are useless junk.

(2) Always fight offensively (even while defending): Frederick the Great is said to have relieved any of his cavalry commanders who waited to receive the enemy's charge. The true potential of the mounted arm is in offensive combat.

(3) Organize and train the way you intend to fight: Combined arms has evolved from the army corps of Napoleon's day to today's brigade. It's time that it evolves even further to a combined arms battalion that crosses traditional branch lines. The factors of METT-T are

important when organizing for combat, but so are mutual trust, understanding, and habitual relationships. We must find a means and method of recognizing, and combining both, and at the same time dispensing with branch parochialism.

(4) Never forget history: We must place renewed emphasis on the study of past conflicts. The statue in front of the National Archives says it best. "What is past is prologue." The problems and challenges that today's commander face have been solved by someone before. The trick is finding and applying the solution. The thorough study of the history of our profession is an invaluable tool in this regard. Also, never overlook the history of our particular unit. It may seem trite, but colors, guidons, patches and crests are combat multipliers that cost next to nothing.

With the above rules in mind its "out on a limb time." My proposed mounted force structure, to meet the challenges of the next century, is along the following lines;

(1) Change our army from one based upon divisions to one based on brigades. Divisions are too cumbersome for the twenty-first century fight. Remember how long it took us to get to the Gulf? Our potential enemies are not stupid. They won't give us six months next time. Brigades are easier to station, train, modernize, mobilize, and deploy, and when properly organized can pack nearly the punch of today's "Army XXI" division.

(2) Design a mounted brigade that is self-sufficient all the time. It should contain "joint compatible" C4I, robust reconnaissance, fire support (aviation, field and air defense artillery), and a world-class logistics system, as well as the teeth arms.

(3) The combined arms battalion's organization is anybody's guess. My particular favorite is the balanced approach of two mechanized infantry companies and two tank companies, with a headquarters containing engineer, signal, mortar, air defense, and reconnaissance platoons. An organic service company would contain all of the battalion's service support requirements. No "just in time" logistics belonging to some other commander for this kid. I would want to control my own destiny. The organization described would seem to meet most of the presumed parameters of METT-T. Will it meet them all? Of course not, but it will meet most of them. Cross-attachment between battalions will become the exception, not the rule. There is just no such thing as a perfect organization.

(4) To summarize, the brigade I envision would have a headquarters battalion containing the brigade headquarters company, signal company, MI company, attack/recon aviation company, and ground recon troop. It would also contain three combined arms battalions, a field artillery battalion, and a support battalion containing very robust medical, maintenance, and supply and transportation companies.

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(5) Remember that history stuff I mentioned above? Well here is where those patches, crests, and colors come in. Any reorganization such as that outlined above will make most of us trip on our old school tie. It does not have to be that way. We must keep a link with our historical past. Redesignate divisions as brigades (1st Armored Division becomes 1st Armored Brigade). There would be no change in history, patch, insignia, etc. It just becomes a smaller unit designed with today's and tomorrow's requirements in mind. All it takes is a one-line entry in the lineage and honors certificate. Regiments have been the historical backbone of the army, ever since there has been an army. Under this proposal, I would redesignate battalions as regiments. Thus the 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, becomes the 32d Armored Regiment. Brigades would be assigned regiments associated with the former divisions. Therefore, the 1st Infantry Brigade would have as its assigned combined arms regiments the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry; 4th Armored Brigade would have as its combined arms regiments the 35th, and 37th Armor and the 51st Infantry. There would be enough to go around to fit in all those LTC requirements that the branches guard so jealously. Lets face it, we are not British; we fought a war about that, you will remember. Then why should we blindly adopt a regimental system based upon the British model, which has failed miserably to preserve our unit's history since it was first placed into effect in 1957?

I want to close by thanking all those associated with *ARMOR* Magazine, and the Armor Association, for 38 years of pleasure and professional stimulation. As I write my check today to renew my membership, I hope you will continue to stimulate what's left of the brain of this broken-down old infantryman.

CHARLES W. TREESE
LTC, USA (Ret.)
Colorado Springs, Colo.

Be Kind to the Infantry: Pick Up the Phone

Dear Sir:

I read your editor's note in the May-June 99 issue of *ARMOR* and must chastise you! I found myself bristling when I read how you and your loader went out of your way to make a young foot soldier's life more difficult, forcing him to slog through the mud to use a broken phone, and gloating about it. I suppose dismounting never occurred to you. (Just how long was that phone inoperable, anyway?)

As a Bradley company commander in 1st Cav, I had the pleasure of working with many fine armor officers, from platoon to brigade level, all of whom had a tremendous appreciation for dismounted infantry. Likewise, we grunts have great respect for the capabilities our armored brethren bring to the battlefield.

I would think you might show a little more respect for infantrymen. It's a life fraught with

peril and hardship and worthy of respect. Having been a light fighter too, I have an appreciation for what it's like living in the mud. As such, the humor in your joke is lost on me. That infantry trooper could very well protect you from the RPGs you fear so much... then again, given the lack of respect you showed him, maybe not. Try clearing a defile, a woodline, or a city block without us.

And I close with a quote...Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944.

"It was not a miracle. It was Infantry. The plan had called for the air and naval bombardments, followed by tanks and dozers, to blast a path through the exits so that the infantry could march up the draws and engage the enemy, but the plan had failed, utterly and completely failed. As is almost always the case in war, it was up to the infantry. It became the infantry's job to open the exits so that the vehicles could drive up the draws and engage the enemy." - Stephen E. Ambrose, *D-Day*

KARL E. SLAUGHENHAUPT
MAJ, Infantry
Via email

I'd hoped the vignette would illustrate how far we have come and, in a self-effacing way. My goal was to point out the necessity of a combined arms team and I thought this would be apparent as the column fleshed itself out and by the other pieces in the issue. My apologies if it appeared otherwise to you, as I'm sure some of my infantry friends will testify that I have always held them and their craft in highest regard. - Ed.

Writer Recalls Army Lab Problems Developing Novel Ammo Solution

Dear Sir:

I noticed another article from Don Loughlin on cased telescoped* ammunition and how it may adversely impact the Scout/Tracer program. I have regarded his previous articles in *ARMOR* magazine as factual, very candid, and quite informative on matters pertaining to Armor.

I would like to add my support to Loughlin's hypothesis on cased telescoped ammo. In the late 1970s, while assigned to the small caliber lab at Picatinny, I had a chance to observe up close the many attempts to make this technology work, all to no avail. The Army Chief of Staff and Marines were also enthralled/involvement with the failed super 75mm (cased telescoped) Mobile Protected Gun System (MPGS) — a precursor to the AGS. In short, the Army labs have tinkered with cased telescoped in several calibers and numerous permutations of designs without success. Both insolvable cost and technical problems kept this novel ammo packaging solution from becoming more than a pipe dream. Institutional memory being what it is — very short nowadays — it seems cased telescoped tech-

nology has become a hobby shop for users and developers over the past 20+ years.

I would caution the Armor development community that cased telescoped falls into the category of "promising but not realistic" for a mature weapon system. It is much like the liquid propellant fiasco advocated by the same lab for our artillery comrades on Crusader. CT, then and now, is not ready for putting onto any platform, and especially the scout vehicle, within the foreseeable program schedule.

ROBERT F. GAUDET
Armor, USA, Ret.
Via email

**Cased telescoped ammunition is an experimental system that shortens the length of a cannon round by carrying the projectile within the propellant case. — Ed.*

Military, Civilians Supported Both Sides of Maneuver Question

Dear Sir:

Responding to CPT Coglianese's Nov-Dec '98 letter, "More on Maneuver Warfare: Can We Change a Culture?," I must disagree with much of the content of his letter's second paragraph. He claims that the concept of maneuver warfare "still carries a tremendous amount of emotional baggage" from the mid-1980s debates "where a dedicated cadre of civilian defense intellectuals sought to reform our armed forces from the outside and change our way of thinking about warfare," and the Army "naturally resisted these upstarts, especially their nerve at telling us how to do our business..." He laments, "much of the debate took on the form of personal attacks..."

As someone who was aware of the maneuver warfare controversy and who participated in it with many published letters to the editors of several publications, I must in fairness to historical truth point out that many military personnel became interested in and supported maneuver warfare as an alternative to the "win-by-attrition-through-firepower" approach to fighting they had experienced in Vietnam, and which they, uniformed members of the Army, found reflected in the 1976 edition of *FM-100-5 Operations*, the Army's doctrinal statement, which called for pulling back and wearing down the enemy, "attrit[ing]" him through firepower, and counterattacking and otherwise taking the initiative only after the enemy had been attrited through firepower.

While some civilians did become involved in the debate for maneuver warfare, some civilians entered the debate against maneuver warfare. And many in the military argued for maneuver warfare. These active duty soldiers were supported in their advocacy by some civilians and opposed by other civilians.

CPT Coglianese's picture of maneuver warfare as an entirely or at least essentially civilian-generated concept, which civilians tried to ram down the throats of an unwilling Army

whose members opposed it and resisted it because it came from outside, is inaccurate and misleading.

From what I could see, most of the sparks flew because the opponents of maneuver warfare, both uniformed and civilian, continually and stubbornly saw only the word maneuver in "maneuver warfare" and believed that maneuver warfare, was supposed to be merely about just moving around, and mistakenly believed that maneuver warfare's opposition to winning by firepower-induced attrition was an opposition to firepower in general, when in fact maneuver warfare, properly understood, involves using firepower.

I dispute strongly Coglianese's claim that "much of the debate took on the form of personal attacks." I concede that personal attacks do creep into heatedly discussed issues, but it is certainly untrue to say that "much" of the maneuver warfare debate "took on the form of personal attacks."

But I agree that, as Coglianese claims, the debate "left the heart of the issues essentially unexamined," as regards, as I've stated above, the aspects of maneuver warfare being more than just moving around and of opposition to winning by firepower-attrition, not being opposition to firepower per se.

JOSEPH FORBES
Pittsburgh, Pa.

Advantage of Sling Loads Is Their Quick Insertion

Dear Sir:

In "The Case for an Airmobile, Amphibious Scout Vehicle," Mr. Crist states that "the HMMWV is a little too wide to fit into a CH-47." As a CH-47D aviator, I can say without doubt that this is not the case. The HMMWV fits quite nicely inside the CH-47D.

As to his contention that carrying vehicles as sling loads "exposes the personnel, rotorcraft and vehicle to a number of hazards," well, this is arguable. Sling loading allows an aircrew to insert the vehicle, land, and offload passengers very quickly, limiting exposure time for the aircrew in the LZ. Internally loading the vehicle is time consuming, as is offloading it, exposes the crew to extended ground time in the LZ, and often results in airframe damage when drivers are in a hurry to exit. What internal loading does provide is a higher degree of stealth during ingress/egress.

THOMAS CARLSON
CPT, AV
ACCC 99-4

History Slighted Italian Role In Spanish Civil War

Dear Sir:

As a recognized historian of Italian armor and an *ARMOR* subscriber, I would like to point out some inaccuracies I found in COL

Candil's article ("Soviet Armor in Spain: Aid Mission to Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment," March-April 1999 *ARMOR*).

I am afraid the author has not read some of the essays about the Spanish Civil War, especially the most recent ones from the Italian Army Historical Branch (Rovighi-Stefani, *La partecipazione Italiana alla Guerra Civile Spagnola*), four thick volumes, the last of which was published in 1994, and my modest *Motori!!!, Le Truppe Corazzate Italiane 1919/1994 (Start Engines!!! Italian Armor 1919-1994)*...

...(At) Seseña, on 29 October 1936, some German Pz 1 and Italian CV 35s met a number of Russian gun tanks T-26B. That is recorded as the first tank engagement in Spain and its outcome is still controversial. Colonel Candil seems to trust in the anti-Italian sources only. But we must remember that others (General Emilio Faldella and the Italian War Department of the period) give an almost opposite version of the episode. Only one CV 35 was destroyed and another damaged; three Russian tanks destroyed by our 65/17 anti-tank team and another disabled. Emilio Faldella, in his *Venti mesi di guerra in Spagna (Twenty months of war in Spain)*, Le Monnier, Florence 1939, at page 129, reports that Barresi's flamethrower tank succeeded in stopping a Russian tank but the latter's gunner hit the Nationalist tank, killing the crew. (According to the citation)... I translate literally:

Careless of the danger to which he was exposing himself, he attacked, with his flamethrower tank, an adversary gun armed tank. In this unequal struggle, his vehicle being hit by the enemy gun, he heroically lost his life, together with his driver, still staring, even after his death, at the enemy tank stopped at five meters distance.

Guadalajara, I would say, was not a real defeat for the Italians. They did not withdraw on their original lines of departure. On the contrary, they stopped the Red attack 20 km ahead of those lines, according to a Communist account in a book based on the documents of the *Corpo Truppe Volontarie*... In my opinion, several of our tanks were hit but were recoverable (at least nine), while the "Republicans," it is certain, lost twenty T-26Bs, some of them captured... It was not a complete Red victory because they were so worn down that they could not exploit their success. In addition, a lot of factors contributed to the Italian retreat: bad weather, which meant no air support, and difficult terrain; a low training level of most units; and that their motor vehicles were tied to roads....

I found in our State Archive one roll on the Spanish War and, in particular, about Guadalajara, with some notes from witnesses and a still unpublished secret report. Here it is, to make a long story short:

On 10 March, our advance stopped at Trijueque, but the Italian divisions had to retreat a little because some units were left behind. There they remained in the mud, under rain and snow, with few dry provisions. After five

days, a whole division left the lines to seek shelter, so exposing to encirclement the best unit of the corps, the *Littorio* Division, which was compelled to retreat in its turn.

The responsibility fell mainly on the generals. (I found an anonymous letter to the Duce claiming a treason hypothesis.) The officers lacked practice and the services appeared badly organized. Only the *Littorio* looked like a proper infantry division, with the others being improvised... Moreover, the enemy air force was stronger and closer to their lines, while our air groups were too far from the battlefield.

A last question: If the Italian contribution was so poor after Guadalajara (finally conquered by the Italian tanks on 28 March 1939), why did General Franco order that, at the victory parade in Madrid (March 1939), the CTV had to be the first to march past him, with its 70 surviving tankettes?

DR. NICOLA PIGNATO
Italy

Seeking U.S. Contacts

Dear Sir:

One of the members of the Finnish Armour Guild, Dr. Stig Nyström, is a retired professor of neurologic surgery at the University of Oulu in northern Finland. He has served in the Armoured Division under Gen. Lagus in our last wars and has, upon his retirement, started a research on injuries in tanks. He is looking for literature from the USA and/or a medical collegial contact.

The address of Professor Nyström is:

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RURIK WAHLSTEIN
Chairman
Finnish Armour Guild/Helsinki Div.

Photo Search Seeks U.S. Vehicles in U.N. Service

LTC Paul Malmassari, French Army, is assembling a photo book documenting peacekeeping operations and is seeking photos of U.S. armored vehicles deploying during U.N. operations, such as Haiti, Somalia, etc. Examples might include U.S. M113A3s in service with UNPREDEP in Macedonia. Also sought are photos of U.S. vehicles in foreign service peacekeeping roles; e.g., a Pakistani M88 in Yugoslavia, a Ghanaian M578 in Rwanda, etc.

The author is a French Army tanker. All photos will be returned.

LTC PAUL MALMASSARI
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